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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 16-1294
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AMIN A. RASHID,
Appellant
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-08-cr-00493-1)
District Judge: Cynthia M. Rufe
__________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 3, 2016
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 7, 2016)
____________
OPINION*
____________

PER CURIAM
Amin A. Rashid appeals from an order of the District Court denying and
dismissing his motion to dismiss the Superseding Indictment in his criminal case. For the
reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

Rashid was charged by Indictment on August 21, 2008 with two counts of mail
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and one count of aggravated identity theft, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5). On May 28, 2009, a Superseding
Indictment charged him with ten counts of mail fraud, eight counts of aggravated identity
theft, and one count of forging or counterfeiting postal money orders, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 500. The mail fraud counts in the Superseding Indictment alleged that Rashid
“knowingly caused to be delivered by mail and commercial interstate carrier according to
the directions thereon, and placed in a post office or authorized depository for mail
matter” ten specific letters. In the aggravated identity theft counts, the Superseding
Indictment charged that Rashid “knowingly and without lawful authority transferred,
possessed, and used, a means of identification of another person … during and in relation
to mail fraud.” After a jury trial at which Rashid represented himself, he was found
guilty of nine counts of mail fraud and all eight counts of aggravated identity theft. The
jury found him not guilty of one count of mail fraud and of forging or counterfeiting
postal money orders. After denying Rashid’s post-verdict motions, the District Court
sentenced him to a total term of imprisonment of 240 months.
On appeal, Rashid contended in his pro se brief that the District Court erred in
denying his motions to suppress evidence, motion for recusal, and motion to dismiss the
indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. Rashid further contended that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions for mail fraud, that the prosecutor’s statements
during closing were not a fair characterization of the evidence, and that the District Court
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denied him due process at sentencing. We rejected these contentions as meritless and
affirmed the criminal judgment. See United States v. Rashid, 593 F. App’x 132 (3d Cir.
2014). Our mandate issued on January 21, 2015.
On March 3, 2015, Rashid filed a motion in the District Court to dismiss the
“jurisdictionally defective” indictment pursuant to current Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(b)(2) (“A motion that the court lacks jurisdiction may be made at any time
while the case is pending.”), and former Rule 12(b)(3),1 arguing that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to convict him. Specifically, Rashid argued that the mail fraud charge
in the Superseding Indictment failed to state that he used the “United States mail” or
“Postal Service.” He argued that the aggravated identity theft charge failed to state that
the identity theft occurred in or affected interstate or foreign commerce, as required by 18
U.S.C. § 1028(c)(3)(A), and/or failed to state that the means of identification was
“transported in the mail,” as required by § 1028(c)(3)(B). Rashid further argued that his
motion to dismiss the indictment on jurisdictional grounds was not untimely because the
time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari had not yet expired when he filed the
motion. For support, he cited our order in United States v. Blood, C.A. No. 08-4101 (3d
Cir. April 28, 2009) (Order), where, after the defendant filed a petition for rehearing
explaining that his motion to dismiss the indictment was filed before the time for filing a
1

We note that the 2014 amendment relocated Rule 12(b)(3) to Rule 12(b)(2). See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 12 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendment. Current Rule 12(b)(3)
requires that a motion alleging that the indictment “fail[s] to state an offense” be filed
pretrial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). Rashid clearly stated his intention to proceed
under current Rule 12(b)(2), which concerns whether the District Court “lacks
jurisdiction,” and which has no time limit other than that the case be “pending.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(b)(2).
3

certiorari petition expired, we concluded that his (former) Rule 12(b)(3) motion was
timely filed, withdrew our opinion, and remanded to the District Court for a ruling on the
merits of the motion.
The Government responded to Rashid’s motion to dismiss the indictment by
arguing that it was meritless, and also procedurally frivolous because our mandate had
issued and thus his case was no longer “pending,” see Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), when he
filed his motion.
In an order entered on January 25, 2016, the District Court denied and dismissed
Rashid’s motion. Noting our Order in Bland, but also noting that we had not yet decided
in a precedential opinion when a case is no longer “pending” under current Rule 12(b)(2)
(or former Rule 12(b)(3)), the District Court reasoned that nothing was pending, that is,
“awaiting decision,” when Rashid filed his motion to dismiss the indictment on
jurisdictional grounds; our mandate had issued and he had not yet file his certiorari
petition.2 Therefore, his motion was untimely filed. The Court in the alternative
concluded that the motion was meritless, because “defects in an indictment do not
deprive a court of its power to adjudicate,” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630
(2002). Last, the Court concluded that, in any event, Rashid’s specific arguments were
meritless. The Superseding Indictment was not defective for its failure to use the
language “United States mail” or “Postal Service,” because the indictment distinguished
between “mail” and private “commercial interstate carrier[s]” and thus the reference to

2

On March 30, 2015, and thus after he filed his motion to dismiss the indictment, Rashid
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court denied on May 18, 2015.
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mail necessarily meant “United States mail.” The Court concluded that the Superseding
Indictment was not defective for failing to allege that the aggravated identity theft
occurred in or affected interstate or foreign commerce, and/or failed to state that the
means of identification was “transported in the mail.” The Court reasoned that the
elements of aggravated identity theft, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, are: (1) the
defendant knowingly transferred, possessed, or used a means of identification of another
person; (2) the defendant did so without lawful authority; and (3) the defendant did so
during and in relation to certain enumerated crimes, including mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §
1028A(a)(1), (c)(5); and the Superseding Indictment adequately stated those elements.
Rashid’s argument was flawed, the Court reasoned, because he had relied upon the
“interstate commerce” and “transported in the mail” requirements of a different statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1028, and the statute he was alleged to have violated, the aggravated identity
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, contains no such requirements.
Rashid appeals. We have jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk advised the
parties that the appeal was subject to summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6. Rashid has submitted a motion for summary reversal, and a supplement.
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Rashid
argues in his motion for summary reversal that his case was still pending within the
meaning of criminal Rule 12(b)(2) because the 90-day period for filing a certiorari
petition, see Sup. Ct. R. 13, had not yet expired when he filed his motion. He argues that
we should follow Blood and hold that his motion should be considered timely filed. We
5

conclude that we need not resolve the meaning of “pending” here, because, even
assuming that a case is “pending” for purposes of Rule 12(b)(2) so long as the time for
filing a certiorari petition has not expired, no substantial question is presented by the
District Court’s alternative determination that Rashid’s motion to dismiss the indictment
was lacking in merit.3 Although we agree with Rashid that the “gist” of mail fraud is the
misuse of the United States mail, his argument that the Superseding Indictment is fatally
defective because it does not use the words “United States Mail” or U.S. Postal Service”
is not persuasive. The Superseding Indictment distinguished between “mail” and private
“commercial interstate carrier[s],” and thus the reference to mail necessarily meant the
United States mail.
As to Rashid’s second concern, the elements the Government is required to prove
in order to convict a defendant of aggravated identity theft are: (1) the defendant
knowingly transferred, possessed, or used a means of identification of another person; (2)
the defendant did so without lawful authority; and (3) the defendant did so during and in
relation to certain enumerated crimes, including mail fraud. See United States v.
Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2009). Rashid has cited no authority, and we know
of none, for his argument that the aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A,
includes a requirement that the identity theft affect interstate or foreign commerce, and/or
For the same reason we also need not decide whether Cotton bars Rashid’s Rule
12(b)(2) motion. Cotton did not concern criminal Rule 12(b)(2), see United States v.
Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 589 (3d Cir. 2004), and, although it reversed the holding of Ex
parte Bain, 121 U.S.1 (1887), that indictment defects are jurisdictional, Cotton, 535 U.S.
at 630, it holds only that forfeited claims of a defect in the indictment -- specifically drug
quantities that increased the statutory maximum sentence -- are reviewed for plain error,
id. at 631.
3
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that the means of identification be “transported in the mail.” The not precedential
decision he cites in his motion for summary reversal, United States v. Agarwal, 314 F.
App’x 473 (3d Cir. 2008), along with a case from another circuit, United States v. Sutton,
13 F.3d 595, 599 (2d Cir. 1994), involve a different statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028, which
criminalizes the production, transfer and possession of false identification documents.
Rashid was charged with violating the aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1028A. United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2012), on which Rashid also
relies, notes the language used in the defendant’s indictment but does not hold that 18
U.S.C. § 1028A includes a requirement that the identity theft affect interstate or foreign
commerce, and/or that the means of identification be “transported in the mail.”
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court
to the extent that the Court dismissed and denied Rashid’s motion to dismiss the
Superseding Indictment pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of jurisdiction.4

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

In addition to denying Rashid’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss the indictment with
prejudice, the District Court stated that its denial of the motion was without prejudice to
Rashid’s right to file a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We
express no view about this aspect of the District Court’s order because the issue is not
before us. “Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court
may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom.” Deposit Guaranty National Bank
v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) (emphasis added).
4
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